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PROPOSED ILLINOIS REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE ACT
HAZEL CRAWFORD'

LLINOIS has been laboring long under the hampering yoke
of mortgage enforcement laws which are cumbersome
and expensive, and which therefore discourage the investment of funds in mortgages on real estate located in this
state. True, there are investors currently braving these laws,
but when the tide turns from the present "borrowers market" Illinois may be one of the first states to feel the effects
of withdrawn funds unless these laws are remedied.
Fortunately, a bill revising the Illinois law of mortgages
has been drafted by the very able real estate lawyers who
compose the Chicago Bar Association Committee on Mortgages and Foreclosue Laws,' in co-operation with the Committee on Mortgages of the Section on Real Estate Law of
the Illinois State Bar Association.' This bill has been introduced in the present session of the General Assembly, where
it has been referred to the Judiciary Committee. We shall
not now treat with all of the changes to be effected by the bill
if enacted; only a few outstanding ones will be noticed.
NEGOTIABILITY

In Olds v. Cummings,' decided by the Illinois Supreme
Court in 1863, which involved the foreclosure of a mortgage
securing two notes, it was held that a mortgage did not par1 Member of Illinois Bar.
2 Messrs. Isaac S. Rothschild (chairman), Herbert Becker, F. Howard Eldridge,
S. Ashley Guthrie, Walter V. Schaefer, and John Lyle Vette.
3 Messrs. Paul W. Gordon (chairman), C. M. Granger, Theodore E. Kircher,
Joseph D. Lawyer, and George R. Lyon.
4 31 Ill. 188 (1863).
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take of the negotiable character of the note it secured. In
subsequent decisions 5 this doctrine has been relaxed, although the case has not been actually overruled because in
reaching its decisions in the later cases the court distinguished the facts from those in Olds v. Cummings.' The most
recent of these more liberal decisions is that of Marks v.
Pope,' in which the Supreme Court held that usury is not
available as a defense in a foreclosure suit where the plaintiffs are bona fide purchasers of bearer bonds secured by
trust deed.
The question of negotiability has been settled in the present draft of the new foreclosure bill by making the mortgage
in the hands of a bona fide purchaser thereof for value "subject only to such defenses of the mortgagor, his legal representatives or assigns, as appear of record at the time the
mortgage is recorded or appear in the mortgage itself or
would be available in an action at law upon" the credit instrument. 8 The limitation of defenses to those of the mortgagor, his legal representatives or assigns leaves unaffected
the claims of lien creditors, and these are further protected
by Section 191, which specifically provides that the act relating to mechanics' liens 9 shall not be affected by the proposed
Mortgage Act.
INCLUSION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY IN

THE MORTGAGE

One of the difficulties encountered where a mortgage is
placed upon an apartment building, furnished or unfurnished, or upon hotel property is the inclusion of a lien upon
the refrigerators and the furnishings and equipment used in
and about the building incidental to its operation. Although
the loan may be for ten, fifteen, or twenty years, the statute
limits the period of a mortgage on chattels to not to exceed
three years, with right of renewal for a short period. 10 A care5 Peoria & Springfield Railroad Co. v. Thompson, 103 Ill. 187 (1882); Peacock
v. Phillips, 247 Ill. 467, 93 N.E. 415 (1910); Foreman Trust & Sav. Bank v. Cohn,
342 Ill. 280, 174 N.E. 419 (1931); Silverman v. Bullock, 98 Ill. 11 (1881); Colehour
v. State Savings Inst'n, 90 Ill. 152 (1878); Zollman v. Jackson Savings Bank, 238
IIl. 290, 87 N.E. 297 (1909); Marks v. Pope, 370 Ill. 597, 19 N.E. (2d) 616 (1939).
6 See "Negotiability of Illinois Mortgages," 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvIEw 270;
also, note, 27 Ill. B. J. 346.
7 370 Ill. 597, 19 N.E. (2d) 616 (1939).
5 Proposed Act, § 12.
10 Ibid., Ch. 95, § 4.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 82, §§ 1-39.
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ful lawyer can, and will, of course, make due provision for
renewals and new chattel mortgages by a covenant in the
trust deed or mortgage to this effect, but in practice the enforcement of such a covenant is often awkward and undesirable. At best, it is not the satisfactory procedure that a mortgage at the beginning of the term for the entire period of the
loan would be.
Then, too, the present act relating to chattel mortgages
declares" that no conveyance of personal property having
the effect of a mortgage or lien thereon shall be valid as
against the rights and interests of any third person unless
possession of the property is delivered to and remains with
the grantee or unless the instrument provides for possession
to remain with the grantor and the instrument is acknowledged and recorded or filed as provided in that act. 2 Such
mortgage must be recorded or filed in the office of the proper
recorder of deeds within ten days of its execution or it will
not be valid as against the creditors of the mortgagor even
though later admitted to record but will be fraudulent and
void as to such creditors. 3 The result is that, if the provisions
of this act are not meticulously followed, the mortgagee may
find he has no mortgage on the chattels.
As if this were not enough, the statute regulating the
assignment of notes secured by chattel mortgages requires
that a note so secured bear a notation indicating that fact,
or the mortgage will be void. 1 4 However, the courts have held
that as between the original parties the mortgage will be
valid even though it does not bear such endorsement. 5 The
note when endorsed or assigned by the payee is made subject to all defenses existing between the payee and the
payor. 16 Contrast this complicated procedure with the comparative simplicity of a real estate mortgage.
11 Ibid., § 1.
12 A special section, ibid., § la, deals with consumable property and unplanted
crops.
13 I1. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 95, § 4.
14 Ibid., § 26.
15 Sellers v. Thomas, 185 Ill. 384, 57 N.E. 10 (1900); Hogan v. Akin, 181 Ill. 448,
55 N.E. 137 (1899). See also Springer v. Lipsis, 209 ll. 261, 70 N.E. 641 (1904),
where possession of the mortgaged property was taken before the lien of a third
party attached.
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 95, § 26.
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The proposed new mortgage act cures these difficulties
by providing that personal property used in the operation,
maintenance, care or use of the mortgaged real estate or
improvement thereon, or furnished for the use of a lessee or
other occupant of the premises, or used in the conduct of any
business, enterprise or other activity conducted on the premises, including replacements and after-acquired property,
may be included in a mortgage of the real estate. Excluded
are "the mortgagor's household goods, or the implements,
stock, crops, supplies or equipment of his farm, or the stock
in trade of his business."1 7
Under the proposed mortgage act, compliance with the
law relating to chattel mortgages would be unnecessary to
the validity of the mortgage lien upon such personal property. With the recording of the instrument as a real estate
mortgage in the county in which the real estate is located,
the lien of the mortgage on the personal property would be
effective as against all persons as long as the personalty
remained on the mortgaged property."' For all purposes of
the act, such personal property would be "deemed, treated
and dealt with in all respects as a part of the real estate to
which it appertains," even as to foreclosure.1 9
PERIOD OF REDEMPTION

One of the most drastic changes embraced in the proposed act is the reduction from fifteen to six months of the
over-all period of redemption.2 0 Although the Illinois law was
changed by statute in recent years to permit waiver of the
right of redemption by a corporate mortgagtor 21 (a provision
retained in the proposed act),22 the right of redemption in the
individual is so inherently and sentimentally a part of the
law of this state as to be considered sacred and something
not to be tampered with. Investigation of the theory of the
redemption period and of the percentage of cases in which
redemption has been made would make this position seem
to be without solid foundation. The purpose of the redemption
period is to give the owner an opportunity, a breathing space
17 Proposed Act, § 21.
20 Ibid., §§ 67, 68.
22 Proposed Act, § 83.

18 Ibid., § 22.
19 Ibid., § 23.
21 Laws 1933, p. 682; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, 01. 77, § 18a.
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as it were, to re-adjust his finances, or to refinance the property if possible. If he cannot do this within six months after
the foreclosure sale, it would seem unlikely that he could do
it more readily in fifteen months. Of course, it can be argued
that the longer the period of redemption, the greater the possibility of a financial recovery, but to follow that argument
to its ultimate conclusion would be to extend the redemption
period indefinitely.
As a practical matter, the longer redemption period
serves only to increase the cost of investment to the mortgagee, and because of that to discourage investments within
the state. It is economically unsound to have real estate tied
up in the processes of foreclosures and redemption. Such a
situation results in a stalemate, which prevents the healthfulness of a free market because the title is unmarketable until
the redemption period has run. The committee which prepared the draft of the proposed act made inquiry, necessarily limited but still indicative, of the number of redemptions made during the great foreclosure era through which
we have recently passed, and it was found that except for
those made as a part of reorganization machinery the percentage of redemptions in the foreclosures in the state during
that period as to which they had information was minute.
If a man must permit his property to go through the processes of foreclosure because of defaults in periodic payments,
it is unlikely that he can redeem it after the entire debt has
been accelerated and the additional expenses incident to the
foreclosure have been incurred. As for redemption by one not
the owner, this rarely occurs.
The effect of the redemption statute is favorable not
alone to the mortgagee for it will force a larger bid and thus
reduce the deficiency judgment. Moreover, the new bill contains a protective provision- which allows "any person liable
for the payment of any balance of the mortgage indebtedness remaining unpaid after the application of the proceeds
of the sale" to claim as a credit on his debt, where the property has been directly or indirectly acquired by the owner
of the indebtedness, the difference between the amount of
23

Ibid.. § 112.
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the bid and the fair market value of the property at the time
of sale if the latter should be greater than the bid.24
A further feature of the proposed act favorable to the
owner of the property sold, which would change the present
law, is contained in Section 63, which permits the owner to
purchase at the sale free and clear of interests and liens not
having priority over the foreclosed mortgage, except interests and liens which would be recognized or enforced if the
owner or his assignee had then acquired title otherwise than
through foreclosure sale.
Another proposed change in the redemption machinery is
to reverse the order in which redemptions may be made, that
is, to permit redemption by creditors in the first part of the
redemption period and by the owner in the last period. Such
a change in the order of redemption has been suggested from
time to time, at least as early as 1925.26
The present redemption statutes in Illinois are complicated, and to consider them adequately would require more
space than can be given to the subject here. For the present
purpose, which is to point out the simplification of redemption procedure and what may be considered the advantages
of the changes which would be effected by the proposed act,
it is sufficient to generalize.
The law under which we have been operating, of course,
gives "any defendant, his heirs, executors, administrators or
assigns, or any person interested in the premises, through
or under the defendant" (except corporations which have
waived the redemption privilege) the right to redeem during
the first twelve months following the foreclosure sale, 27 and
any decree or judgment creditor, his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns (who are not required to have an
interest in the property) during the immediately subsequent
three months.2 8 If redemption is made by one entitled to re24 Provision is made for reducing the credit claimed against a holder of only
part of the indebtedness "to that proportion thereof which such part of the indebtedness bears to the entire indebtedness and shall be applicable only to that part
of the indebtedness." Ibid., § 115.
25 Ibid., §§ 64, 65, 67, 68.
26 Durfee and Doddridge, "Redemption From Foreclosure Sale-The Uniform
Mortgage Act," 23 Mich. L. Rev. 825, 861. See also Kircher, "Some Suggestions
Concerning Illinois Foreclosure Laws," 3 John Marshall L. Q. 193.
28 Ibid., § 20.
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 77, § 18.
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deem in such three-months' period, he must resort to execution sale, and if there are successive redemptions, each redemption must follow the same procedure.2 9
The mortgage act now pending before the legislature
limits redemptions to any person having an interest in or
lien upon the specific property, 0 and thus eliminates the
anomalous redemptions permitted under the present law in
the state." Further, each redemption under the proposed act
would operate as an assignment of rights of the purchaser at
the foreclosure sale32 and would be effected by33 depositing
with the officer who made the sale, for the benefit of the
party from whom redeemed, the redemption moneys, so that
there would be only one sale, i.e., the sale pursuant to the
decree of foreclosure.
RENTS AFTER SALE

At the present time, in the absence of a provision to the
contrary in the mortgage instrument, the rents during the
redemption period belong to the owner of the equity of redemption. 4 However, where the mortgage instrument
creates a lien upon such rents, the court may appoint a receiver to collect the rents and apply them on the deficiency,
if any, resulting from the foreclosure sale. 5 Any balance of
such rents after payment of the deficiency and other charges
allowed by the court belong to the owner of the equity of redemption. 6 After the redemption period has run, if the master's deed is not promptly issued to the party entitled to it,
the rents from the time the period of redemption ends to the
time the deed is issued belong to the owner of the equity of
redemption whether or not the mortgage instrument contains
provision for a lien on rents. Legal title to the property is in
the owner of the equity of redemption until such deed is issued, and if it is not issued within the statutory period of
30 Proposed Act, § 64.
29 Ibid., § 23.
31 Il. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 77, § 18-27; ibid., Ch. 72, § 10.
33 Ibid., §§ 77, 78.
82 Proposed Act. § 69.
34 Owsley v. Neeves, 179 Ill. App. 61 (1913).
35 Henry v. Woolf, 187 Ill. App. 129 (1914).
253, 63 N.E. 633 (1902); Stevens v. Hadfield, 178
36 Stevens v. Hadfield, 196 I.
Ill. 532, 52 N.E. 875 (1899); Haigh v. Carroll, 209 Ill. 576, 71 N.E. 317 (1904); Longley v. Wilk, 171 IMl. App. 419 (1912); Townsend v. Wilson, 155 Ill. App. 303 (1910).

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

five years after the redemption period has run 7 the certificate of sale becomes null and void and the title remains in
such owner, unless the deed was wrongfully withheld or its
issuance enjoined by court order or decree." Even though
the trust deed provides that the person entitled to a deed unredempder foreclosure sale is entitled to the rents during the
39
tion period, the courts will not so apply such rents.
The proposed act gives to the person ultimately entitled
to the deed to be issued pursuant to the foreclosure sale the
rents, issues and profits of the property during the period
from the foreclosure sale until the deed issues, or the time
allowed for its issuance expires, whether or not the mortgage
constitutes a lien upon, or contained an assignment of, such
rents, issues and profits, and regardless of whether the
amount realized on foreclosure sale was less than the mortgage indebtedness.4 "
TRUSTEES AND COMMITTEES

Of interest to lawyers and small investors should be the
sections of the proposed act relating to trust deeds and trustees thereunder, 1 and to committees and other group action.42 With these sections as a part of the statutory law of
Illinois, investors might again become interested in bond issues, without which it is sometimes difficult to finance large
properties. Before discussing these provisions, it may be of
interest to digress somewhat in order to refer back to situations which were, at least in part, responsible for their incorporation into the proposed act.
Prior to the debacle in the fall of 1929, real estate first
mortgage bonds were considered a conservative and proper
investment for those who were not in a financial position to
indulge in the speculative field of stocks or who could not
make a large investment. Then came the defaults in a torrent, sweeping away the income from these bonds thought to
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 77, § 31.
38 For a detailed discussion of receivers and the right to rent, see Reeve, Illinois Mortgages, Ch. 28, where the subject is dealt with ably and at length.
39 Coleman v. Mulcahey, 334 Ill. 64, 165 N.E. 189 (1929); Schaeppi v. Bartholomae, 217 Ill. 105, 75 N.E. 447 (1905); Powell v. Voight, 261 Ill. App. 127 (1931).
40 Proposed Act, § 92; § 93 makes specific provision for refunding these rents in
the event redemption is made.
41 Ibid., §§ 121-141.
42 Ibid., §§ 151-158.
87
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be so secure, and in all too many instances causing shrinkage
of the principal.
The procedure developed of forming committees, the personnel of which was composed largely of responsible men
who were experienced in the financial and real estate fields,
and most of whom probably had been with the trustee or the
house of issue as officers or employees and who had been
familiar with the properties or bond issues in question while
the securities were being sold or serviced. Deposit agreements were prepared by lawyers for the committees, the
bondholders were notified of the defaults and the formation
of the committees, and were asked to deposit their bonds
with the depositary (usually a department of the trustee) under the terms of the deposit agreement. Because the cost of
printing and mailing these deposit agreements to all bondholders were prohibitive, a copy usually was kept on file with
the depositary open for inspection by the holders of the bonds
to which it would relate, and a summary of the provisions
of the deposit agreement was mailed to the bondholders. The
committee, when it represented sufficient bonds to comply
with the requirements of the trust deed, might then direct
the trustee to foreclose. In some cases it was possible to
acquire the property for the bondholders and complete reorganization without a foreclosure.
Great was the opprobrium sometimes cast upon these
committees by a few people who charged them with being
self-perpetuating, of "milking" the properties, and of not
making bondholders members of the committees.
A recent law review article,48 in speaking of deposit
agreements says: "These deposit agreements were long and
contained very drastic provisions as regards the rights of
the bondholders. They gave the committee practically unlimited powers to deal with the defaulted properties." And
later, on the same page, the article states: "The drastic, if
not vicious, deposit agreements have so far proved effective."
It is difficult for a lawyer who has worked with a conscientious committee which has effected the reorganization
48 Carey and Higgs,
551 (1939).

"Reorganization-The Last Chance," 34 IlM. L. Rev. 549,
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of an extraordinarily large number of properties under long
deposit agreements containing "practically unlimited powers
to deal with the defaulted properties" to read that statement
without feeling a degree of shock over the description of
those deposit agreements as "vicious." That article and the
many statements it contains require a detailed answer too
lengthy to be attempted here. But a word of explanation
concerning the reason for those powers may not be amiss.
It is simply that there devolved upon the committee the responsibility of entering into negotiations and completing contracts looking toward an ultimate reorganization of the
property. Unless the deposit agreement gave the committee
flexibility so that it and those with whom the committee dealt
had assurance that it could complete its undertakings, it
could not function effectively.
The depositors had the privilege of withdrawal for a limited time after submission of the plan of reorganization to
them-a time long enough for the depositor to decide whether
he wanted to participate in the plan or act independently of
the committee. Furthermore, regardless of the complete
powers vested in the committee under the deposit agreement,
the committee was in a trust relationship to the bondholders
who deposited, and a court would hold the committee members to the duties of a trustee and to strict accountability of
the trust.
Without undertaking a detailed defense in their behalf,
it would appear that the cases were infrequent where committees thus formed did not represent the depositing bondholders well in the light of all of the circumstances. They
stepped in and performed a service, and performed it well,
at a time when it was needed to preserve the investment
for the bondholders who could not act independently with respect to the mortgage or trust deed.
If the reorganization personnel was closely bound up with
the trustee and the house of issue, this was considered necessary to protect the responsibility which the trustee and the
house of issue felt to the investors, the bondholders, and to
protect the advances of funds made by the trustee which
were required to carry on the committee work, to pay the
out-of-pocket expenses incurred in foreclosure of the trust
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deed, and in many cases the payment of taxes and acquisition of tax sale certificates to stop the accrual of huge tax
penalties where the earnings of the property were insufficient. Without these advances the investment of the bondholders would be further jeopardized.
The committee members selected were for the most part
experienced business men familiar with the operation of
properties and investments. It seems patent that to put a
man on a committee simply because he owned some of the
bonds would be hazardous to the welfare of all of the holders
of bonds of that particular issue, unless in addition to his
bondholdings he had the experience necessary to qualify him
for the work which the committee had to do and the responsibility to make him exercise care in his dealings with and on
behalf of the bondholders. It was interesting to observe during that hectic period that many of those who complained
most bitterly about the committees and denounced them most
loudly were not original holders of the securities but those
who, for the purpose of speculation, had bought them after
the foreclosure proceeding was started. And there were critical others who did not fully appreciate the practical problems involved. To critics, however, we should be grateful,
because, although they may make life more difficult, they
also make man more careful in the exercise of his powers.
With the default in mortgage payments came also a complete collapse of our economic structure. Because of decreased earnings, families doubled up and tripled up in one
apartment. This caused vacancies, which in turn caused
lowered rentals. Added to this was the further grief of high
taxes and inability to pay them from the reduced earnings of
the properties, with the resultant tax defaults and rapidly
pyramiding penalties. Because of the general situation,
people were not investing in real estate, and purchasers for
the properties, either in court or out of court, could not be
found.
It was impossible for the committees to push the foreclosure proceedings to sale, and thus save fees and expenses
incident to the properties being in foreclosure, until money
could be obtained in some fashion to pay the out-of-pocket
expenses of the proceedings, including the nondepositors'
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share of the sale proceeds. As soon as this money could be
obtained, the trustee, the committee, and their attorneys
would, if necessary, usually accept notes of the reorganization entity for their fees and expenses, and the deposited
bonds were credited with the share allocable to them without
the passage of any money. This would permit the committee to acquire the property at the foreclosure sale for purposes of reorganization with a minimum outlay of cash. An
outside bid could not be found which would pay anything to
the bondholders after expenses.
Out of this situation arose three questions in particular
which were new to our state equity courts. The first of these
involved the right of the trustee under the trust deed to bid
for the property, or the power of the court to direct the trustee to bid. The second, concerned the power of the court to
set an upset bid price for the property. -The third question,
as to whether the state equity court had the power to pass
upon plans of reorganization, also arose around this time,
partly as a result of the Securities and Exchange Act, which
became law in 1933.
RIGHT OR DUTY OF TRUSTEE TO BID

The law in Illinois on the problem of whether the trustee
has the right to bid and whether the court has the power to
direct the trustee to bid has been established by judicial decisions. A very brief resume of the cases may be of some
interest.

The first of these to be considered by the Appellate Court
was Straus v. Chicago Title & Trust Company,"' in which
an order of the Circuit Court of Cook County, denying a bondholder leave to file an intervening petition in a foreclosure
suit by which she sought, among other relief, to have the
trustee directed to bid at the foreclosure sale for the benefit
of the bondholders, was reversed by the Appellate Court and
the matter remanded with directions to proceed in accordance with the views expressed in the opinion. The views on
the question of a bid by the trustee were that under the provisions of the trust deed the trustee might purchase the prop44

273 IM. App. 63 (1933).
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erty at the sale for the benefit of the bondholders, and that
the chancellor might compel such purchase.
In the fall of 1935, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Chicago
Title & Trust Company v. Robin,4 5 for the first time considered the question of whether a court of equity has the inherent
power to order a trustee to bid for trust property at a foreclosure sale where the trust deed does not expressly so provide. The decision was that it has not such power, and the
Appellate Court was reversed. This decision was followed
in Chicago Title & Trust Company v. Bamburg,4 6 a case with
similar facts. Likewise, in Grant v. West End Pine Building Corporation,7 the court held that unless the trust deed
contained an express provision conferring upon the trustee
the right to bid or conferring upon the court the power so to
direct it, a court of equity lacks inherent authority to order
the trustee to bid at a foreclosure sale.
Some adverse criticism has been directed at those decisions which fail to construe into the trust deed the right of
the trustee to bid for all bondholders where the provisions of
the instrument do not expressly give this power. When
the point is raised that the bondholder should have the right
to decide whether he wants cash or a participating share in
the property, the reply sometimes is that the committee representing the majority bondholders "chills" the bidding, the
price bid is not a fair representation of the value of the property, and thus the nondepositor does not receive a fair return on his investment, whereas the depositors have an unfair advantage in that they acquire the property, and the
nondepositor, or minority bondholder, is not protected. The
conclusion of those who advance this criticism is that the
trustee should acquire the property for all of the bondholders
and thus all would be equally protected.
It would seem that the criticism is not convincing if the
court assumes jurisdiction of the plan of reorganization and
permits the committee to bid. The court may alter the provisions of the plan if they appear to it to be inequitable, or
it may substitute an entirely new plan, and may approve or
disapprove the fees and expenses of the reorganization. The
45
47

361 Ill. 261, 198 N.E. 4 (1935).
361 Ill. 488, 198 N.E. 349 (1935).

46

361 Ill. 291, 198 N.E. 10 (1935).
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nondepositor may deposit if he wants to share in the property,
or he may take his share of the proceeds of sale if he prefers
to realize what he can on his investment without further delay. There are many bondholders who are at an age where
the delay involved in liquidating the property at a reasonable sale price so that they might receive more cash on their
investment would mean that before this could be accomplished they would have passed into that realm where material assets are of no avail and the only assets that matter
are the good deeds they have done. This is a practical and
a real aspect. Admittedly these do not constitute all nondepositors. Some of the minority bondholders refrain from
depositing to give their bonds a "nuisance" value, others because they prefer to realize on their investment as soon as
possible. Whatever the reason, the minority bondholder
should have the right to decide what he wants to do where
he has not contracted away this right by buying securities
which are secured by a trust deed containing proper provision for the trustee to acquire the property on behalf of all
of the bondholders.
The proposed act provides that upon a petition being filed
in a proceeding to foreclose a trust deed in the nature of a
mortgage securing bonds or notes which are held by more
than one person and where the entire indebtedness has become due by acceleration or otherwise, the court may
authorize or direct the trustee to bid at the foreclosure sale
for the property involved in the proceeding for the benefit
48
of the holders of all of the outstanding bonds or notes.
Such petition may be filed by the trustee or the holders of
not less than 10 per cent in amount of the securities then
outstanding,4 9 but must be joined in by the holders of twothirds in amount of the securities in order that the relief
prayed for might be granted."
In connection with these sections, it is interesting to note
the decision in Detroit Trust Company v. Stormfeltz-Loveley
Company5 where it was held that a Michigan statute authorizing the court, upon the petition of a majority of the bondholders, to direct the trustee to bid where it appeared that
Proposed Act, § 131.
49 Ibid., § 132.
50 Ibid., § 134.
51 258 Mich. 655, 242 N.W. 227 (1932).
48
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no bid was made or obtainable, seriously impaired the obligations of the contract of the nonassenting bondholders and
that there was a serious deviation from the express trust
created by the trust deed. However, in that case the statute
was enacted after the mortgage in question was made,
whereas the proposed Illinois act does not affect existing
mortgages. 2 Nor does Article X thereof (containing the provisions in question) affect the provisions of the trust deed
on the points covered in such article, but the relief provided
for therein may be available to the extent not inconsistent
with such provisions. Another factor in that case was that
the nonassenting bondholders did not receive notice and
therefore could not appear. Although the trustee could foreclose on behalf of the bondholders without notice to them as
to the foreclosure suit, the court said that "notice was necessary under the special type of proceeding provided by the
act." Section 133 of the proposed Illinois mortgage act provides for notice, and section 134 gives the right of hearing to
any bondholder.
POWER TO FIX AN UPSET PRICE

The second question referred to above as to the right of
the court to set an upset price to be bid, is not dealt with by
the proposed act, except that section 132, which states who
may sign the petition praying that the trustee be directed or
authorized to bid at the foreclosure sale, requires that the
petition set forth the maximum and minimum amounts which
it is proposed the trustee shall bid.
When the Illinois Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Robin case,53 it indicated that the court could
not set an upset price. However, this was not necessary to
the decision, as the court pointed out in Levy v. BroadwayCarmen Building Corporation,4 in which it held that the
equity courts of Illinois do have the power to fix an upset
price, and said:
There is little or no difference between the equitable jurisdiction and
power in a chancery court to refuse approval to a report of sale on fore52 Proposed Act. § 192.
53 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Robin, 361 Ill. 261, 198 N.E. 4 (1935).
54 366 Ill.
279, 8 N.E. (2d) 671 (1937).
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closure, and the power to fix, in advance, a reserved or upset price, as
a minimum at which the property may be sold ....

No reason appears

why the chancellor cannot prevent a sale at a grossly inadequate price
by fixing a reasonable sale price in advance. The same judicial power
is involved in either action.
By way of dicta the court added:
The fixing of an upset price does not violate section 10 of article 1 of
the Federal constitution nor section 14 of article 2 of the Illinois constitution, which inhibit the impairment of the obligation of contracts.
The reserved price dealt only with the remedy ...
Thus, the power of the equity court to fix an upset price at
a foreclosure sale is recognized in Illinois.
POWER TO APPROVE PLAN OF REORGANIZATION

In 1933 the Securities and Exchange Act made unlawful
the transportation of securities or the sale or offer to buy
securities in interstate commerce or through the mails unless a registration statement was filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and unless the prospectus relating to
the securities met the requirements of such act.5 5 The preparation and printing of these forms and the exhibits to them
were costly, and were practically prohibitive in the average
reorganization of real estate. Some discretion was permitted
the Commission to exempt classes of securities. However,
many reorganizations could not come within the exemptions,
and to ease further the situation as to reorganizations an
amendment was passed in 1934 to provide for certain exempted securities and exempted transactions in addition to those
provided for when the act originally became law.5 6 Among
these exemptions were securities issued in a reorganization
pursuant to a plan which has been passed upon by a court.5 7
Committee then began to present plans of reorganization to the state equity court for approval in the foreclosure
proceeding. The question as to whether such court has the
power to pass on a plan of reorganization in a foreclosure
proceeding was first presented to the Supreme Court of this
state in FirstNational Bank v. Bryn Mawr Building Corpora55 Securities and Exchange Act (1933), § 5 (48 Stat. 77, 906; 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e).
56 Ibid., §§ 3 and 4 respectively.
57 Ibid., § 3 (a) (10).
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tion. 58 The foreclosure decree had been entered at a previ-

ous term of court and had become final. The court held that
equity courts of this state should, and do, have such jurisdiction.
Article XI of the proposed act confirms specifically the
jurisdiction of the foreclosure court to approve a plan of reorganization. It constitutes the members of the committee
trustees and subjects them to the supervision of the court,"9
prescribes certain provisions of the deposit arrangement, 6
provides for judicial supervision of all group action, 61 and permits the court to consider "the fairness and feasibility of the
plan," 62 which may not be approved, however, without notice and hearing for all.6" The court may fix the fees and
''pass upon the propriety of all expenses paid or incurred in
connection with the plan, ' 64 and may "approve the terms and
conditions of any proposed issuance and exchange of securities under a deposit agreement or a plan. .... ,,65 It should
be noted also that the proposed act deals specifically with
the highly controversial question of control of bondholders'
lists. 66

These provisions and those last discussed, dealing

with supervision of group action,67 should clarify a situation
upon which there has been little law in this state and should
serve as guideposts for lawyers and courts alike.
METHODS OF FORECLOSURE

A new and interesting provision is contained in section 34
of the proposed act, which contemplates the accomplishment
by passive means of a result which has often been effected by
the affirmative act of the parties. That is the acquisition by
the mortgagee of absolute title to the mortgaged property
free and clear of liens and of the equity of redemption. That
section permits the court to enter a decree in the foreclosure
proceeding which would satisfy the mortgage indebtedness
by vesting absolute title to the mortgaged property in the
mortgagee free and clear of all claims, liens and interests
of the mortgagor and those claiming through him, where all
58 365 III. 409, 6 N.E. (2d) 654 (1937).

60 Ibid., § 152.
68 Ibid., § 155, 156.
66 Ibid., §§ 161-164.

61 Ibid., § 153.
64 Ibid., § 157.
67 Ibid., §§ 151-158.

59 Proposed Act. § 151.
62 Ibid., § 154.
65 Ibid., § 158.
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parties to the suit agree to such decree, or, even if all do not
agree, such decree may be entered if the relief is prayed
for in the complaint, if no defendant is a minor or under other
disability, and if personal service has been had on the owner
and his or her spouse and neither of them files an answer
objecting to the entry of the decree. Title obtained by the
mortgagee under this section would also be free and clear of
all rights to redeem except where a defendant other than the
owner answers, objecting to the decree, in which event the
objector would have the same rights of redemption which he
would have had had there been a foreclosure sale to the
mortgagee for the full amount of the mortgage indebtedness.
It is obvious that such a decree if entered would save much
of the present foreclosure expense, since it obviates the necessity for a foreclosure sale.
This is not to be confused with strict foreclosure, which
is preserved in the present act,6" but which has been rarely
used in Illinois. Strict foreclosure does not find favor with
the courts because it cuts off the equity of redemption. They
have, therefore, clothed it with difficulties. Illinois statutes
actually prohibit it in the case of mortgages made by executors, 6 guardians70 and conservators.7 ' The present provisions for foreclosure by scire facias 2 have not been carried
into the proposed act, but have instead been specifically repealed.73
Provision is made in the pending bill7 4 for sales under
powers, which are at present forbidden under Illinois law, 5
although they were at one time permissible. 76 The procedure
contemplated follows in general that prescribed for foreclosure under the proposed act. However, a partial foreclosure
under power of sale would not be possible, because it is required that the entire mortgage indebtedness shall have become due, either by accleration or otherwise.7 7
68 Ibid., § 31.

69 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 124.
70 Ibid., Ch. 64, § 27.
71 Ibid., Ch. 86, § 22. For a discussion of strict foreclosure in general, see Reeve,
Illinois Mortgages, Ch. 37.
72 IRl. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 95, §§ 18-22a.
73 Proposed Act, § 191.
74 Ibid., §§ 41-53.
75 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 95 § 23.
76 Reeve, Illinois Mortgages, § 838.
77 Proposed Act, § 45. For a general discussion of these provisions, see "Proposed Illinois Legislation Providing for Foreclosure of Mortgages by Means of
Power of Sale," 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 90 (1940).
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CONCLUSION

One of the most practical and far-reaching effects of the
new act, if enacted, would be the reduction in the costs necessary to the foreclosure of the mortgage instrument and the
reorganization of the property involved. This attempt to
make foreclosure less expensive is particularly illustrated
by section 33, which provides that unless an exceptional situation requires reference to a master in chancery or commissioner, "the evidence shall be taken in open court," except in
the case of matters of complicated account where the items
are disputed. It further provides that if a fact alleged in the
complaint is not controverted by answer filed thereto, a
sworn verification of the complaint on separate affidavit
setting forth the fact shall be sufficient evidence and eliminate the necessity of further evidence as to the fact. The
present practice is, of course, to refer to a master or commissioner even routine evidence. After so hearing the evidence he must prepare his report to the court and the matter
must be set down for hearing before the facts come to the
court for decision. The result is an expensive and dilatory
procedure.
The proposed act seeks to remedy this by provisions
tending to reduce the cost of foreclosure and to eliminate the
delays in our present procedure. Thus it should serve to attract the flow of capital into Illinois mortgage investments
and ultimately to benefit the borrower.

